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Abstract 
Civil order is an important aspect of a healthy democratic society, however the right to 
express dissatisfaction at the state of affairs is also important to a democracy. These two 
points come into conflict when protests escalate out of control or turn into riots. Utilizing 
a comparative case study methodology with a grounded theory framework, this study 
seeks to understand how different police actions in protests can escalate the event into a 
riot, what factors are present when this occurs, what are the situations which necessitate 
that police make turning point choices, and what tools or concepts can police apply to 
successfully navigate these situations in a community focused nonviolent or non-
confrontational way. By analyzing the cases of the 1999 WTO protests in Seattle and the 
2014 Ferguson protests, themes indicating what actions escalate protests were extracted. 
This research has suggested that police lack of preparedness, focus on order and control, 
and lack of suitable internal and external communication contribute to protest escalation 
and that implementation of a few training and preparation strategies may be effective in 
mitigating the potential for escalation at the critical moments. 
Keywords: protest, police, escalation, community, civil liberties 
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Protest Escalation: 
A Comparative Case Study Exploring Tools for Police for Successful Protest 
Engagement 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Civil order is an important aspect of a healthy democratic society, however the 
right to express dissatisfaction at the state of affairs is also important to a democracy. 
These two points come into conflict when protests escalate out of control or turn into 
riots. In western style democracies there is a fine line that police are required to navigate 
in order to maintain democratic ideals of protecting citizen rights and upholding public 
order. However, there are times when police concern shifts towards a return to order and 
protesters are dealt with by force. These are interactions which can lead to increased 
violence and disorder, yet still leave the perception of power in the hands of the police. 
While it is important that police maintain authority on a certain level, there should be 
space for bringing issues to public attention without recourse to violence from police or 
the public. Unfortunately in the context of contentious issues and confrontational 
demonstrations, riots and violence are not uncommon outcomes. This outcome leaves 
neither the police nor the protesters in a desirable state, the protesters lose their voice and 
the police lose public confidence. 
It has been emphasized that police play a role in escalating riots, but they are also 
responsible for controlling them. Waddington (1987) posed that “the central dilemma for 
the police is how to contain violent disorder whilst using only minimal force” (p. 46). 
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The idea of mob sociology, wherein a crowd is seen as losing its individual rationale and 
therefore being easily influenced and manipulated, is used to justify the escalated force 
model, where the police objective is to quell disorder as quickly as possible. In this 
model, First Amendment rights are ignored, there is a low tolerance for community 
disruption or changes in status quo, nor is there much if any contact or communication 
between police and protesters, aside from police infiltration. These standards facilitate 
mass arrests, as well as the use of force in lieu of arrests for crowd dispersal 
(Schweingruber, 2000). Nassauer (2015) highlighted five vital interactions for keeping 
protests peaceful: that both police and protesters remain in their respective and agreed 
upon spaces, the police maintain professionalism and internal communication, neither 
police nor protesters show signs of aggressive behavior, an absence of property damage, 
and the police and protesters have an understood and trusted flow of communication 
about needs and intentions. Van de Klomp, Adang, and Van den Brink (2011) also 
stressed the importance of properly nurtured community relations in contributing to the 
success of repressive measures alongside relational measures in a riot situation. The 
possibility of avoiding repressive measures through relational policing style of protests 
should be examined to prevent escalation into a riot or other situation that might require 
repressive action. 
Statement of Problem 
 Protests are an almost constant occurrence in the United States and around the 
world, generally designed to create a type of disturbance or at least disruption of the day 
to day ordinary routine in order to draw attention and consideration to some issue. In the 
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United States many forms of protest are protected under the First Amendment protection 
of free speech, which is designed to protect citizens and the media from censorship when 
speaking out against problems with the government, such as corruption or other 
unconstitutional behavior (US Dept. of Justice, Global Justice Information Sharing 
Initiative, & United States of America, 2011). Therefore government intervention in 
protest has to be carefully considered. However, in view of the purposes and strategies of 
protests, i.e. disruption and disturbance, it falls to the governmental entities of law 
enforcement agencies, police, to bear the responsibility of maintaining the safety of the 
public, as well as that of the constitutionally protected protesters.  
 The problems begin when the purposes of the police and the protesters conflict, 
which while there is no comprehensive certified list of U.S. protests, occurs frequently 
enough to stimulate public discomfort with police engagement in protest. Police make an 
effort to create a controlled environment within which protests can occur in an orderly 
manner, thus ensuring safety is maintained and police duty is fulfilled. Unfortunately 
there are numerous cases around the United States where these carefully laid plans fail to 
account for some of the unpredictable eventualities of protests, and sometimes protests 
deliberately oppose these plans because they are antithetical to the aims of the protest. 
When this occurs the backlash is significant. Protesters, the police, and the public become 
endangered as the police and protesters fight to achieve competing goals. The aftermath 
of these events tends to result in public outcry, frequently directed toward police 
mismanagement of the protest.  
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 Policing of protests is not something new to law enforcement agencies, but 
neither is the eventuality of an escalating protest. Law enforcement agencies share best 
practices across cities, counties, and states, describing what did and did not work in 
various experiences in order to help each agency be better prepared and each event to be 
better managed. With the wealth of experience and institutional knowledge behind protest 
policing, how do some of these events escalate in such disastrous ways? There are all 
kinds of protests that go un-notably smoothly, but what are the commonalities between 
the numbers of protests which do escalate in dangerous and unanticipated ways? 
 Existing research suggests that communication, and its connection to police 
relationship with the communities concerned, plays an important role in the perception 
and reception of police involvement and interventions during protests. There is 
substantially less research which examines critical tipping points which spur changes in 
police tactics, and conversely protester responses to police actions. This study seeks to 
begin to fill that gap through comparison of two protest events which escalated into riots; 
one being the Seattle, WA protest in 1999 of the World Trade Organization conference 
(WTO) and the Ferguson, MO protest in 2014 of the fatal shooting of Michael Brown, a 
black teen, by white police officer Darren Wilson. This comparative case study utilizing 
grounded theory will work to establish what common pivotal moments and occurrences 
lead to the escalation of these protest and create a checklist of steps to mediate those 
moments.  
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Background 
 The WTO conference was set to be held in the U.S. in 1999, and Seattle made its 
bid to be the host city. By the end of January 1999 Seattle had been selected to host this 
international conference. From this point forward preparations began. A committee was 
established between city organizations and major local corporations to handle the 
organizational aspects of the conference. The Seattle Police Department was placed in 
charge of organizing the conference security. It was made clear on multiple occasions 
that responsibility for security was in the hands of local law enforcement and neither the 
federal government nor the WTO administrators would provide logistical or financial 
support (Seattle Police Department, 2000). The Seattle Police Department took on this 
responsibility relying on their past experience with large events such as the Goodwill 
Games in 1990 and the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation conference in 1993. The 
SPD (2000) expected that the WTO conference would be less considerable than the two 
cited experiences, because unlike those events, the WTO conference did not anticipate 
participation of any heads of state.  
 The SPD planning for the conference was extensive, spanning from the end of 
January 1999 until the start of the conference at the end of November the same year. 
However, it failed to adequately prepare the agencies involved for the scope of the 
protests that occurred. The SPD contacted neighboring police agencies to request support, 
as well as the Washington National Guard to be on standby for the event. These other 
agencies were not deeply involved in the planning process beyond the request for 
support. The majority of the planning around the expected protests was to meet with 
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protest organizers to establish safe demonstration and procession details. Demonstration 
management aspects were related to goals of conference security, escort of delegates and 
dignitaries, and traffic management (SPD, 2000). With the unanticipated scope of the 
protest, compared to the demonstration management preparations, safe escort of delegates 
was hindered along with the other goals. 
 When the WTO conference was scheduled to begin on November 30, the protest 
blockaded transport of delegates, effectively foiling the conference opening ceremonies. 
This occurrence demonstrated the obstruction of all of the SPD’s security goals. To move 
forward the SPD began using primarily chemical irritants, such as pepper spray and tear 
gas, along with methods of less lethal force, such as rubber bullets and batons, to move 
protesters out of direct contact with the conference site. Protests persisted, and the SPD 
continued using the same methods to move them constantly away from the conference 
site. This went on through the length of the conference and protesters were not permitted 
to return to the area of the conference until the final day of the conference on December 
3rd. Throughout that time, small blocks of destructive and criminal activity occurred 
within the larger protests. These criminal components were not addressed individually, 
the SPD was unable to make targeted arrests and instead continued to rely on moving the 
entire protest away from the conference. The arrival of the Washington National Guard 
provided the SPD and other cooperating agencies with some relief, allowing for the de-
escalation of the event coinciding with the end of the conference. 
 In Ferguson there was no planning for an organized event and anticipated protest, 
and many of the established Ferguson Police Department practices played a role in the 
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events from August 9th to August 25th 2014. On August 9th an encounter between Michael 
Brown, a black teen, and the FPD led to his fatal shooting by Officer Darren Wilson. 
Community presence and the FPD procedures following this shooting grew into large 
scale demonstrations protesting FPD treatment of the community’s black residents and 
seeking police accountability.  
 Prior to these events the Ferguson Police Department had a poor history with the 
black community in Ferguson. Many of the standard practices in Ferguson were focused 
on revenue generation, therefore, public safety and restoration were not a priority (The 
U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, 2015). City code and statute violations 
were issued in vast quantities and the court process for addressing the incurred fines was 
difficult and unaccommodating, leading to more and more fines without concern for 
resolution of the violation. The U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division (2015) 
documented extensive use of overly vague statutes, such as failure to comply and 
resisting arrest, as provocations to the use of force. These practices resulted in distrust 
and resentment among the effected community. The lack of community focus from the 
FPD delegitimized their position creating an environment where the community was less 
interested in cooperating with law enforcement efforts. This de-legitimization in the 
perspective of the community was reflected in the protest response to Michael Brown’s 
shooting and the police handling of that scene. 
 Local residents began to gather immediately after Michael Brown was shot at 
noon on August 9th, this crowd grew and eventually developed into demonstrators and 
protest after the crime scene investigation ended that evening. As the crowd grew, the 
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police presence grew in response. The intention was to secure the scene for the ongoing 
investigation, however, the community perception was of police intimidation, as canines 
and armored vehicles were brought to the scene (Institute for Intergovernmental 
Research, 2015). Throughout the investigation of the scene the FPD did not communicate 
with the gathered community about what was happening with the investigation, leaving 
the community to speculate.  
Once the FPD finished and cleared the scene, it was expected that the crowd 
would also dissipate, but after holding a vigil the crowd remained and began protesting in 
earnest the following day. The FPD responded in the same way they had at the scene of 
the shooting, using a militarized response, increasing police presence, with canines, riot 
gear, and armored vehicles. As night came, destruction arose and the FPD were not 
prepared to make the number of targeted arrest that would have been necessary to prevent 
continued destructive and criminal activity. The FPD requested assistance from 
neighboring police agencies and continued with the militarized response. This approach 
was adjusted when the incident command was reassigned to Captain Ronald S. Johnson 
of the State Highway Patrol, who attempted to decrease the militarized presence and 
implement a relational approach. This change in approach brought a temporary relief to 
the escalation of the incident, however tensions returned with FPD presentation of 
security footage suggesting Michael Brown had committed robbery prior to the shooting. 
The decreased militarized presence and the relational approach persevered, and by 
August 25th, with a request from Michael Brown’s family the incident was able to 
deescalate. 
PROTEST ESCALATION  13 
 
 
Rationale 
 Through a critical comparison of the two cases described above, this study is 
meant to illuminate the ways that protests escalate and how police agencies can better 
approach them. As was previously noted, protest is an integral aspect of U.S. democracy 
and society, protests will remain a prevalent occurrence in the voicing of discontent and 
values. If police are intended to be involved in the management of protests, it is critically 
important that they are provided with resources to follow that mandate through without 
compromising human and civil rights. This research is meant to support that endeavor by 
generating a better understanding of what leads to problems and escalation and 
subsequently what resources police agencies need to better address protests. 
 While this study focusses on two cases of U.S. protests, the need for this research 
is applicable to other Western style democracies as well. Police involvement in managing 
protests is not unique to the U.S., but there are varying approaches used internationally 
just as there are across the United States. Everywhere that police encounter protest with 
any kind of expectation of freedom of expression, there is that precarious balance to be 
made in protecting those expected rights and protecting public safety and order. This 
research can be used as groundwork to analyze protest response practices in other 
Western style democracies just as effectively as it can be used in the United States. For 
example, as a researcher, I saw that the police struggle with persistent protests and riots 
in Northern Ireland in the context of historic cultural and political divides. The shape of 
these protests and riots has remained ostensibly the same for decades. Though there are 
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different cultural contexts shaping events in Northern Ireland, this research could serve as 
a relevant launch point for examining the police role in those contexts. 
 Beyond the scope of Western style democracies, this research may not be 
impactful to internal efforts to address protests, as other styles of governing may not 
place the same value on freedom of expression or take the same approach to police 
responsibilities. However, it may be applicable to approaches of external influences 
working within these bodies. In some countries, expression of negative views of power 
systems is illegal and gravely punished. This does not necessarily prevent protests from 
occurring. In my studies I found this to be the case in Thailand, where there are steep 
prison sentences for anyone expressing disparaging views of the King. In countries with 
this type of perspective on expression, protest is discouraged. Therefore, when it does 
occur it is not addressed with consideration for civil rights. In the international 
development field there are people and organizations that make an effort to observe 
human rights violations in these types of situations. The U.S. is often viewed as a check 
and upholder of human rights across the globe. With this perspective, it is pertinent that 
understanding internally how to find the balance of public safety and order with human 
and civil rights will provide insight, or at minimum, one step in how to address the same 
concept as a development actor in a country that does not necessarily hold the same 
values. 
Research Questions 
 Utilizing a comparative case study methodology with a grounded theory 
framework, this study seeks to understand how different police actions in protests can 
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escalate the event into a riot, what factors are present when this occurs, what are the 
situations which necessitate that police make turning point choices, and what tools or 
concepts can police apply to successfully navigate these situations in a community 
focused nonviolent or non-confrontational way. The propositions which are guiding this 
study, based on the literature include; escalation occurs when police and protesters do not 
maintain continuous and open communication (Nassauer, 2015), escalation occurs when 
the police have a poor relationship with the community and norms and standards differ 
between them (Gillham & Marx, 2000, & Waddington & King, 2005), and escalation 
occurs when police and protesters view each other as obstacles to their objectives 
(Reicher et al., 2004). These propositions come from the theories developed in past 
researcher and literature, which this study is building on and contributing to, they guide 
this study in the sense that they are the preexisting perspectives regarding protest 
escalation. 
Definition of Terms 
Escalation: The change in dynamics and atmosphere of an event moving upward on a 
scale from peaceful and uneventful, to destruction and disorder, to unimpeded violence 
and rioting, and all intermediary iterations. 
Civil liberties: The rights of citizens and residents, extending from basic human rights to 
constitutionally ensured rights. 
Incident response: The cooperating agencies and actions which are involved in 
managing a protest or escalating event. 
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Turning point: Moments in protests where actions, taken or not taken, move the 
situation onto a trajectory of continued escalation, particularly when possibly a more 
calculated action could have moved the situation in the opposite direction.  
Strategic objectives: Specific approaches to an event intended to achieve specific goals 
and outcomes. 
Tactics: Specific actions implemented in an event. 
Chemical irritants: The array of chemical based tools such as pepper spray and tear gas 
used by agencies generally to disperse non-compliant crowds, rioters, or combative 
individuals. 
Militarization: The use of military style approaches, such as tanks, armored vehicles, 
sniper style surveillance, or combat and riot gear.       
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 Predicting the escalation of a riot is an often studied subject. Researchers have 
examined theories of geographical and racial implications in the spread of riots, as in 
Myers (2000) study of diffusion of collective violence, as well as what features of 
protests are most likely to illicit police attention (Earl, Soule, & McCarthy, 2003). From 
the starting point of protests, Nassauer (2015) identified five vital police to crowd 
interactions necessary to keeping protests peaceful. Though Nassauer’s study was very 
recent, similar ideas about police role in the escalation of protests had been introduced by 
Waddington (1987) almost 20 years prior. While protests are a fairly structured 
framework for examining the eruption of riots, not all riots begin from an organized 
gathering of that nature. Frequently violent riots burst out of mounting community 
tension due to economic or cultural oppression (Chuchouisuwan, Chantachon, & 
Rodhetphai, 2011). In situations like this King (2004) and Murphy, Sargeant, and 
Cherney (2015) indicated the importance of community confidence in the police for the 
de-escalation of riot situations. Despite the abundance of compounding evidence and 
research which emphasize de-escalation recommendations, the same problems continue 
to arise in the practice of policing civil disorder which allow for the escalation of riot 
situations. 
  There is always some form of impetus for the onset of a riot. Some event shifts a 
group of people into a seemingly cohesive violent mentality. While this shift tends to 
appear as a sudden explosion, it is the result of tensions growing and impacting over 
time, until a situation bringing indignation arises which creates the perception of violence 
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as a legitimate reaction, and presents the opportunity for solidarization through violence 
(Van de Klomp, Adang, & Van den Brink 2011). In the case of the 1999 Woodstock riot, 
bystanders were unaware of the growing discontent of the concert-goers who were 
catalyzed into rioting by the underwhelming and overhyped finale of the festival (Vider, 
2004). Even though the participants cited many different reasons for taking part in the 
riot, the fact of prior mounting frustration throughout the festival was apparent. Vider 
(2004) used this case to illustrate that while the rioters act as a group, the motives which 
they act upon “may be less unified than the rioters themselves believe” (p. 149). 
Diversified motives can cause concern in addressing riot situations which are generally 
approached as a cohesive mob, however given the understanding of growing group 
tensions leading into the riot situation, there is still an avenue for a cohesive approach. 
 Many of the tactics actually employed are not as effective as they could be in a 
long term perspective of maintaining public order. One strategy that is still in use in some 
places is the escalated force approach. This tactic comes from a perspective of mob 
sociology, which frames protesters or a gathering of the public as unorganized leaderless 
crowds falling into riot behavior by agitator influence. Schweingruber (2000) described 
how this agitation can come from internal individual influence within the crowd, or by 
external influence by unjustified action from the police or an other, or even by exposure 
of police weakness. “The strategies that police adopt toward these demonstrators depend 
not primarily on the demonstrators “objective” actions or attributes but on the socially 
constructed images of the demonstrators and predictions about their behavior” 
(Schweingruber, 2000, p. 372). The idea of mob sociology is used to justify the escalated 
force model, where the police objective is to quell disorder as quickly as possible. In this 
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model, First Amendment rights are ignored, there is a low tolerance for community 
disruption or changes in status quo, nor is there much if any contact or communication 
between police and protesters, aside from police infiltration. These standards facilitate 
mass arrests, as well as the use of force in lieu of arrests for crowd dispersal 
(Schweingruber, 2000). This also aligns with the riot curve theory which describes a riot 
as beginning from a state of normal policing, to high tension, which leads to pre-riot 
stage, progressing to the apex of the riot, then falling to the post-riot stage, and back to a 
state of normal policing (King, 2004). In these models of crowd behavior an escalated 
force approach to policing addresses the main concern of return to order. However, 
Schweingruber (2000) suggested that as a result of this perspective of the inevitability of 
the progression of the riot stages “police often provoked the expected violence and 
“proved” the “reality” of the images” (p. 372). This approach to crowd and riot policing 
may appear effective in accomplishing the desired outcome, but that may simply be 
because it perpetuates the framework which provides its justification. 
 When police have been determined a necessary presence at a protest or 
demonstration there are certain interactions and signs which can escalate the situation 
toward rioting. Nassauer (2015) described signs, such as, protesters beginning to don face 
masks, as indicating to police that violence is imminent, while police suiting into riot gear 
indicates the same to the crowd. Dependent on the type of demonstration, police may be 
in riot gear from the very start, generating a higher tension atmosphere with a greater 
likelihood of rioting. Though this practice is intended to result in a more timely response 
to violence, Perez (2003) would “argue that certain applications of high levels of direct 
repression will not only be ineffective in quelling a riot but may in fact be escalatory, 
PROTEST ESCALATION  20 
 
 
worsening an already volatile situation” (p. 155). This type of result is likely when police 
repression is excessive or selective, which it can appear to be when a seemingly peaceful 
demonstration is met with officers in full riot gear, when the police have poor training in 
crowd control, or when police to community relations are strained or lacking in formal 
channels for feedback (Perez, 2003). Again in the escalated force approach, there are no 
formal channels of communication between the police and the crowd, and the police 
focus on forceful dispersion without regard to First Amendment rights. As King (2004) 
illustrated the concern that “crowd control tactics will not succeed without the necessary 
legitimation, support, and involvement of the local community. Such conditions are 
unlikely to be achieved wherever senior officers interpret community activities according 
to a “criminal” frame of reference” (p. 135). However, some newer protest policing 
approaches theoretically address these issues. 
 Police practices which emphasize trust and confidence can promote the sustaining 
of peaceful protests and demonstrations. The negotiated management strategy of protest 
policing can accommodate the factors which promote peaceful demonstrations, as it is 
based on respect for First Amendment rights. Nassauer (2015) highlighted “five vital 
interactions for keeping protests peaceful: respect for territorial boundaries, good police 
management, absence of escalation signs, absence of property damage, and well-working 
communication between protesters and police” (p. 7). This means that both police and 
protesters remain in their respective and agreed upon spaces, the police maintain 
professionalism and internal communication, neither police nor protesters show signs of 
aggressive behavior, and the police and protesters have an understood and trusted flow of 
communication about needs and intentions. According to Nassauer’s (2015) study 
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findings, these factors can certify a peaceful demonstration. The negotiated management 
strategy is for the most part in accordance with these factors. Negotiated management 
starts with respect for First Amendment rights, permits a high tolerance for community 
disruption, in terms of redirected traffic and large gatherings, promotes open and frank 
communication between police and demonstrators, and avoids arrests and the use of 
force. However, in practice this strategy has not always been as limited in force as 
suggested, and many areas where it had been adopted reverted back to mob sociology and 
escalated force approaches due to a negative feedback loop (Schweingruber, 2000).  
 It can be expected that a relational approach like negotiated management would 
be less favorable when considering the vulnerability it creates if poorly managed. 
Waddington (1987) described the “fear, anxiety, anger, and frustration amongst officers” 
(p. 40) when policing a disorderly crowd from close quarters. Van de Klomp, Adang, and 
Van den Brink (2011) stressed the importance of properly nurtured community relations 
in contributing to the success of repressive measures alongside relational measures in a 
riot situation. While Murphy, Sargeant, and Cherney (2015) determined that most people 
were more willing to cooperate with police when they felt they were treated with respect, 
fairness, and neutrality. The perception of the police as effective in their duties also 
contributed to public cooperation. This places the police in a peculiar situation, as police 
tend to receive harsh criticism if they fail to foresee escalation toward a riot and fail to 
take pre-emptive action. Therefore the imperative “is to “do everything one can” in the 
circumstances, which in the context of policing civil disorder, means intervening as 
forcefully as necessary, within the limits of the forces capability, to restore order. 
Therefore, this amounts to bias against restraint” (Waddington, 1987, p. 43). At the same 
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time restraint has been implicated as a key factor in respecting and gaining cooperation 
and control of a crowd or community. 
 In case studies of successfully managed riots, respect was demonstrated as an 
important factor to the return to order. Hoopes (2002) analyzed the management of a riot 
over benefits for the unemployed by Chester Barnard in 1935. This situation showed the 
signs of growing tensions, which finally erupted into a riot when police aggressively 
confronted protesters. Chester Barnard met with representatives of the protest and, 
through communication showing respect and recognition of dignity, managed to 
negotiate a cooperative agreement (Hoopes, 2002). Similarly a case study of riots based 
in religious cultural tensions in Thailand were addressed using a peaceful cultural model. 
It was concluded that due to the layers of causal tensions, to solve the riot problem “must 
need understanding of basic, needs, collective consciousness and collective cause of most 
local people; including respecting liberty and cultural identity of one another” 
(Chuchouisuwan, Chantachon, & Rodhetphai, 2011, p. 158). These examples, while 
successful, are of management outside of the policing stage. Yet it is the “consistent 
failures by police to confront protests in an even-handed and impartial manner [which] 
bare much of the responsibility for the riots” (Perez, 2003).  
 It has been emphasized that police play a role in escalating riots, but they also are 
those responsible for controlling them. Waddington (1987) posed that “the central 
dilemma for the police is how to contain violent disorder whilst using only minimal 
force” (p. 46). This is not an easy task when police have to approach confrontational 
protest styles (Earl, Soule, & McCarthy, 2003). The aggression from the anxiety of the 
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situation becomes an unfortunate influence. Nassauer (2015) hoped to address even this 
aspect of fear in protest policing, suggesting that “police training and professionalism can 
maximize well-working management and organization and decrease the likelihood of the 
perception of danger” (p. 12). Waddington (1987) also suggested the fact of well 
protected officers, through effective riot gear, have less incentive for taking over-reactive 
pre-emptive action out of fear of being injured. While both these ideas have benefits the 
first requires extensive training and reshaping of protest management strategies, and the 
second brings in a sign of escalation.  
 In the case of the World Trade Organization (WTO) protest in Seattle in 1999, 
these points were not fully addressed, but there may have been more contributing factors 
anyway. While communication occurred prior to the protest in a strategies negotiation 
between protest organizers and police there was no form of ongoing communication 
throughout the event (Gillham & Marx, 2000). In fact both sides were employing secrecy 
tactics. The protesters were not sharing specifics about their actions between groups 
within the protest, in order to avoid leaking information to the police that would allow the 
police to prevent or impede the actions. On the other side the police did not want 
protesters to know their tactics so that they could be prepared in a way to nullify their 
purposes (Gillham & Marx, 2000). While the strategic points can be understood from 
both perspectives, the result was anger and frustration in both parties. Particularly 
because neither side seemed to be following the strategies agreed upon prior to the protest 
(Gillham & Marx, 2000). How could either side stick to their original strategy if the other 
side was not following the script either? One of the issues is that a script can only be 
followed in a vacuum. There were too many unknowns in the actual event for either side 
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to stick entirely to the agreed upon plan. As a result, both sides felt betrayed and angry, 
leading the situation to escalate (Gillham & Marx, 2000).  
 It is unlikely, however, that the situation would have proceeded as planned even 
absent the unexpected variables of the actual event. This can be inferred from the practice 
of secrecy within both groups. Had both parties intended to follow the strategies agreed 
upon in the negotiation, then there would have been no need for secrecy, as all plans were 
already shared and known. Unfortunately there is a lack of trust and understanding 
between the parties creating an expectation of betrayal and therefore a sense of 
entitlement to not follow the agreement. In this situation the police were unprepared in 
terms of staff to have the capacity to follow through with the agreed upon tactic of mass 
arrests (Gillham &Marx, 2000; & Herbert, 2007). The police had been assured of 
“scripted civil disobedience” (Gillham & Marx, 2000, p. 218) which would result in 
arrest, but were unprepared for events to actually proceed that way.  
 In response to vandalism and in efforts to maintain order and control, without the 
man power for mass arrests, police began using non-lethal crowd dispersal tactics. This 
included tear-gas and concussion grenades (Gillham & Marx, 2000). However, just as the 
police seemed to not expect the protesters to follow the agreed upon script, the protesters 
also expected the police to detour from the agreement. The negotiations established that 
police would not be using chemical irritants and similar non-lethal dispersal weapons, yet 
the protesters had prepared themselves with gas masks and vinegar soaked bandanas to 
protect themselves from precisely these types of tactics (Gillham & Marx, 2000). As a 
result these tactics were largely ineffective in achieving police objectives. Protesters were 
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protected and mostly unhindered by the gas, while unintended targets, such as shoppers, 
WTO delegates, and city officials were affected (Gillham & Marx, 2000). Instead of 
dispersing the protesters these tactics fueled protester distrust, anger, and sense of 
betrayal, escalating the aggression of the crowd and strengthening protester resolve 
against police.   
 After the first day of protests proceeded much differently from the agreement, the 
city passed an emergency zoning ordinance to effectively ban protest in the downtown 
area where the WTO event was taking place (Herbert, 2007). The protesters didn’t see 
this as a legitimate action, because they had gained approval for that location in the prior 
negotiations and had already occupied the space from the first day of the protest (Gillham 
& Marx, 2000). The protesters treated the ordinance with an attitude of “no take backs” 
and continued to occupy the applicable zone. Police found these actions to be a challenge 
to their authority and control (Gillham & Marx, 2000; & Herbert, 2007). After tear gas 
had proven less effective than anticipated, police also utilized rubber bullets and 
concussion grenades to move protesters to more desirable locations in the Capitol Hill 
neighborhood where they could more easily control the crowd out of the way of business 
and commuters. From this point the situation again escalated, with increased aggression 
and disorder (Gillham & Marx, 2000).  
 Considering the lack of follow through in the agreed upon strategies, which 
resulted in escalation of aggression and disorder on both sides, it seems that one of the 
root causes was a lack of trust. Noakes and Gillham (2007) studied how the Seattle WTO 
incident influenced police and protester interactions since 1999 and noted that police 
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often have difficulty in getting past stereotypes of protesters. This seems evident based on 
the case of WTO protest in Seattle, that police had a certain expectation of the protesters 
despite what was communicated during negotiations prior to the protest. But this is not 
simply an issue that the police have. Protesters hold certain beliefs about police that are 
difficult to move beyond. Noakes and Gillham (2007) noted that “despite efforts made to 
understand the other side, tensions remained around the respective constructions of 
concepts such as provocation and dialogue” (p. 337). If the protesters are not seen to be 
cooperating in a way compatible with police expectations, the police are also less likely 
to follow negotiated management tactics and will utilize other tactics to exert control 
(Noakes & Gillham, 2007). On the other hand, protesters if feeling overly controlled are 
more likely to see the police as an illegitimate force and will be far less inclined to 
comply (Herbert, 2007).  
 It is possible that regardless of the amount and depth of communication, police 
and protesters would be unable to develop understanding or reach a mutually beneficial 
consensus or compromise. It is possible that frequently the police and the protesters have 
entirely opposing aims, which are incompatible at their core levels. In the case of the 
Seattle WTO protest, the authority of the police may have been seen by some as a part of 
the larger problem of unquestioned power and capitalism represented by the WTO 
(Gillham & Marx, 2000). With this mindset, it is unlikely that protesters would have ever 
felt truly inclined to comply with police, regardless of tactics. Police tend to aim to 
maintain control and order, but that is a goal that protesters are also unable to support as 
they generally rely on disruption to spread awareness for their cause (Reicher, 2004).  
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 In some situations police will attempt to illicit self-policing within the groups of 
protesters, in hopes that they will discourage more serious infractions of their own 
members. One tactic for this is by letting smaller infractions go unpunished. Sometimes 
this tactic will simply result in a new standard of behavior where the smaller infractions 
are the norm and the bigger infractions seem less serious (Gillham & Marx, 2000). This 
result follows the same logic that Waddington and King (2005) described where crowds 
develop norms as they form, in a normative structure. In this way standards are set from 
the start, which police can influence by their own actions and reactions.  
 The opposition in goals and to each other makes protests difficult situations to 
handle, but there are suggestions and tactics that logically address many of the issues that 
seem to result in escalation.  Reicher, Stott, Cronin, and Adang (2004) presented a 
different perspective on crowd behavior, emphasizing the “shift from individual identity 
to social identity” (p. 562). This perspective is important because it explains crowd 
behavior more rationally than the now rejected mob mentality perspective. Where mob 
mentality showed crowds to be dangerous, volatile, and highly susceptible to negative 
and violent suggestion, social identity explains that the crowd behavior is based on the 
values of the crowds shared identity. Depending on the situation this identity could be 
any number of things, in the case of protests it is frequently based around a common 
ideal, such as the environment, labor rights, or anti-capitalism. If the police can 
understand these shared values and identity they can better understand the crowd 
behavior (Reicher et al., 2004).  
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This perspective also explains why forceful interventions can escalate situations. 
When group members see other members attacked it is felt as an attack against the group 
identity and the group will act to defend that collective identity by attacking out groups, 
which tend to be the police in protest situations (Reicher et al., 2004). In the case of the 
WTO protest in Seattle, there was the Black Bloc anarchist group, who frequently are the 
first to enact and incite aggressive behavior and vandalism, the group “agreed not to 
engage in ‘property transformation’ unless police engaged in violence first” (Gillham & 
Marx, 2000, p. 217). If police were seen to deal aggressively with this group without the 
rest of the crowd understanding the motivation or that it was a faction that did not 
necessarily share the same collective identity, they would see it as an attack against the 
group. Reicher et al. (2004) suggested that police adopt an integrative approach, whereby 
they join the crowd and communicate on the ground in real time with the protesters. By 
doing this the protesters would have a closer perspective on police actions and be present 
to the decisions to take actions against members acting outside of the groups values. With 
this closer perspective the group is more likely to take on the role of sanctioning 
aggressive members themselves, reducing the amount of interference needed from the 
police (Reicher et al., 2004).  
An interactive integrative approach by police promotes ongoing communication 
with protesters, which promotes trust and understanding between the parties. Though as 
noted previously sometimes no amount of communication can create true understanding. 
However, Reicher et al. (2004) described two conditions which influence crowds to self-
sanction; one being that they view the acts of some as illegitimate to the collective values 
and standards, or two that these members act in a way which impedes the crowd in 
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accomplishing goals considered legitimate to the collective values and standards. If the 
police can interact in a way that they come to understand these values they can work to 
encourage and not interfere with self-sanctioning. They can also be present enough to 
step in when self-sanctions are inadequate and the crowd has accepted that certain 
members are acting outside of the collective values. This does not entirely prevent 
violence, but it helps to slow and prevent escalation as police and protesters are more able 
to distinguish between isolated groups and the overall crowd (Reicher et al., 2004).  
One of the failings of the WTO protests in Seattle and many protest situations that 
do not seem to go according to plan, is that police act in general terms toward the entire 
protest in reaction to what could, with a different response, be an isolated anomaly. 
Reicher et al. (2004) described “where police treat all crowd members the same, they are 
likely to see themselves as all the same” (p. 568). In this sense, if the police react to the 
Black Bloc actions, in the WTO case, by increasing force across the board, then 
protesters who would otherwise not identify with the values of the Black Bloc suddenly 
find themselves recognizing unity with that group. Generalized forceful interventions 
alienate protesters with legitimate aims from the police, even if the true goal of the police 
is only to prevent spread of the illegitimate actions. The response can have the entirely 
opposite effect from the intention. 
One of the patterns that is appearing is the effort to maintain control and authority 
by police in protest situations. However, control also appears to be where much of the 
conflict arises. Reicher et al. (2004) noted that “as things stand police officers 
predominantly view crowds as a problem and seek to control them, while crowd members 
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see police officers as a problem and feel controlled by them” (p. 577). The problem 
comes from a desire to control and a desire to be allowed to accomplish certain goals, or 
not be controlled. The interesting part is that neither party’s end goal is to possess 
control. Generally the protesters want to make their message heard and for that message 
to have impact. Generally police want an event to run safely and without violence or 
damage and destruction. Somehow both parties get trapped in the idea that controlling the 
situation, or having complete free rein, is what will allow them to accomplish these goals. 
When either party finds themselves losing the edge on this front they increase their grip 
and strain vehemently to keep it. Gillham and Marx (2000) and Herbert (2007) noticed 
that when police found their authority challenged was when they increased control 
efforts. This creates a tug-of-war situation, where if either side gives, even just a little bit, 
they will potentially lose everything. Therefore the situation continually escalates. 
In working to keep a crowd or protest from veering off target and into violent or 
destructive territory, police can take preemptive action. This might sound like the police 
should be more aggressive earlier to discourage violence, but instead they should be 
making efforts from the start of, and prior to, the event to ensure the crowd can achieve 
their goals. In the case of the WTO protest, the pre-protest negotiations were meant to do 
this, but the focus was on actions and tactics, what each party agreed to do or not do, 
rather than what each party hoped to achieve (Gillham & Marx, 2000). Reicher et al. 
(2004) suggested that police take an integrative approach, in which they continually 
communicate with protesters to understand their goals and how the police can assist in 
reaching those goals. Specifically, switching the police perspective from; “how can we 
frustrate them” to “how can we facilitate them” (Reicher et al., 2004, p. 572).  
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Moving into a position of facilitation requires concerted effort. Police need to first 
educate themselves about the social identity associated with the protest (Reicher et al., 
2004). Using this knowledge they can develop a better understanding of the group’s 
values and standards to enable them to better communicate with the group to understand 
their needs and goals. Communication should seek to promote trust and facilitation, this 
can be enabled through finding a trusted and respected group member to initiate 
communication with (Reicher et al., 2004). If the police can understand the values and 
goals of the group, then they will be better prepared to help solve problems which impede 
those goals, giving them the ability to actually facilitate the group in accomplishing their 
aims. In this way the police will be able to gradually build actual trust within the group. 
This trust is integral if and when police action or forceful intervention becomes necessary 
(Reicher et al., 2004).  
If violence occurs in a protest group in which the police have integrated 
themselves and established themselves as actively working to help achieve the group 
goals, they are more likely to be seen as group insiders. When the crowd finds themselves 
facing frustration and aggression they need a scapegoat and generally the police are the 
most obvious outsider to take on that role (Waddington & King, 2005). But if the police 
have managed to integrate sincerely in the group, then protesters who are breaking away 
from the values of the greater group identity will be seen as the outsiders and the crowd 
will be more understanding if the police need to take action to intervene in whatever 
behavior is disrupting the group aims. To do this however, the police have to clearly 
differentiate between groups in the crowd (Reicher et al., 2004). Reicher et al., (2004) 
pointed to this as the most important when signs of violence first arise, if they hope to 
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keep violence isolated. The police must be seen to understand that the actions of one 
group is not necessarily reflective of the entire group, so that the entire group can see that 
their goals and aims are not being impeded by the police or the violent factions.  
With the current perspective in protests of police trying to control protesters and 
protesters fighting against police, it is nearly impossible for the parties not to conflict and 
create an escalating situation. However, if a new approach can emerge as suggested by 
Reicher et al. (2004), in which the two groups work together in an effort to promote the 
goals of the other party, then they can work in harmony. The police will need to take an 
approach of working for the protesters, and use the image that they are present to protect 
and serve that population. If this can become a standard then the protesters will 
appreciate the police presence and collaborate to make that job easier instead of harder.  
For this to happen police need to develop a presence that sincerely demonstrates a 
community service approach. Miller, Toliver, and Schanzer (2012) described how police 
that are engaged in their community demonstrate genuine interest in understanding the 
community. As the community sees this becoming actual standard practice, that sincerity 
will become a positive reputation which, will support the police in their other efforts with 
protests or disturbances. This process does take time, and police will need to put the 
honest effort into “understanding sources of mistrust of the police in different 
communities and work to address them” (Miller et al., 2012, p. 27). Part of this effort is 
focus on transparency. The secrecy that marked the WTO protests can only engender 
more distrust. Police need to “make it clear that they are working in service to that 
community” (Miller et al., 2012, p. 33). If police have nothing to hide, then they will 
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build trust easily, if they remain transparent about their intentions and goals (Miller et al., 
2012). On similar trust building lines, the community will come to believe in police 
intentions if they take on the practice of asking, listening, and delivering (Miller et al., 
2012). With this tactic the community will see the police making the effort to truly 
understand the community needs and if they deliver on those lines, the community will 
see the sincerity. 
This trust building is not a short term project, but if police choose to look at larger 
scale goals, beyond control and contain, this is a necessary process. However, Reicher et 
al. (2004) noted that the “negative costs of trust are more likely to be borne by the front 
line officer, which make them less willing to implement such strategy even if directed by 
a commanding officer” (p. 575). But it is these very same front line officers that are the 
integral piece to developing community trust. Reicher et al. (2012) suggested that these 
issues “need to be addressed through training and operational procedures” (p. 575). While 
Miller et al. (2012) recommended addressing burnout prevention with appropriate 
staffing levels. This suggests that training in community engagement needs to be 
widespread throughout the police department to ensure as many officers as possible are 
prepared to engage in a trust building approach.  
If police are able to treat a protest as a community and support it in reaching its 
goals then they may create a naturally safe environment. Miller et al. (2012) described 
that “community members who feel a sense of belonging to the community as a larger 
whole are more invested in keeping their community safe” (p. 6). This is a concept which 
ties back into the role of self-policing in protests. If the police communicate to 
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understand and support the social identity, or community, of the protest they can help to 
make that community feel responsible and accountable for itself in a way which diverts 
trouble to avoid violence. If police can discover the needs through asking and listening, 
they can present their resources and capacity to help reach those goals, making 
themselves a community asset as opposed to an impediment. As an asset, the police are 
more likely to be supported in their efforts as well. Reicher et al. (2004) described how 
the protest approach needs to change from one where “police officers predominantly 
view crowds as a problem and seek to control them… [to one where] police officers 
consider crowds as an opportunity and seek to enable them” (p. 577). 
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Chapter 3 
Methods 
 This study utilized a comparative case study of two U.S. protests, endeavoring to 
illuminate the phenomena of protests escalating to riots. The Seattle WTO protest in 1999 
and the Ferguson police shooting protest in 2014, were examined side by side, in order to 
discover commonalities in the course of events that may help to understand the escalation 
of the two cases. 
Design and Justification 
 The basic design of this study was a multiple case study with a constant 
comparative method of grounded theory approach to analysis. A case study to investigate 
this particular phenomena was used because, case studies are intended to answer how and 
why questions when the participants and variables cannot be manipulated and when the 
context is relevant to the phenomena (Baxter & Jack, 2008). In studying protests that 
escalate to riots, while it may be possible to establish cooperation to implement an 
experimental policing approach for example, it would not be possible to fully control the 
variables. Not only would it be problematic to implement, but it would be unethical to 
purposefully escalate a protest into a riot for the sake of a study. It is also important to 
acknowledge the importance of context in protests. Every protest has an issue and a goal 
to address, these aspects tend to be intrinsically tied to the people and place where the 
protests occur.  
 The use of a multiple or comparative case study to approach this phenomena 
worked to try to understand the similarities that occur in protests and protest policing that 
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lead to escalation, even within differing contexts. A multiple case study predicts either 
similar results, or contrasting results for predictable reasons (Baxter & Jack, 2008). In 
this study, similar results have already been observed, that of a protest escalating to a riot, 
so the use of the multiple case study will endeavor to understand how those similar 
results came to be, or what can be determined to be the predictable reasons for this 
outcome. 
The approach used in this research is like that of an open ended question, it is not 
encumbered by the goal of proving a hypothesis. This approach is used “to gain insight 
and understanding of a particular situation or phenomena” (Baxter & Jack, 2008, p. 550). 
While the study still utilized propositions, similar to hypotheses, to provide direction for 
the study, a grounded theory approach allows for an openness to encountering findings 
that may or may not align with those propositions. In essence. This approach provided the 
opportunity to move away from predetermined biases and gain greater understanding of 
the phenomena. 
Data Collection and Analysis 
The data for this study was collected and coded from secondary sources 
recounting the two cases. Official federal and state governmental reports detailing the 
events of the protest in Seattle and in Ferguson were examined and coded, by noting and 
extracting, recurring and central themes. After the initial extracting of recurring themes, 
these themes were re-evaluated to determine overlapping concepts, the codes were then 
refined based on the second evaluation to determine what the most significant concepts 
presented in the reports were. This coded data was then analyzed using the constant 
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comparative method of grounded theory. This method aims to develop a conceptual 
understanding of the issue based on the patterns that emerge from the data and building 
on past related research. The focus in the research and analysis of the data generated, is to 
better understand the phenomena, rather than to prove any existing theory, although this 
approach still allows for that outcome. 
Research Questions 
 This study seeks to understand how different police actions in protests can 
escalate the event into a riot, what factors are present when this occurs, what are the 
situations which necessitate that police make turning point choices, and what tools or 
concepts can police apply to successfully navigate these situations in a community 
focused nonviolent or non-confrontational way. The propositions which are guiding this 
study, based on the literature include; escalation occurs when police and protesters do not 
maintain continuous and open communication (Nassauer, 2015), escalation occurs when 
the police have a poor relationship with the community and norms and standards differ 
between them (Gillham & Marx, 2000, & Waddington & King, 2005), and escalation 
occurs when police and protesters view each other as obstacles to their objectives 
(Reicher et al., 2004). These propositions come from the theories developed in past 
researcher and literature, which this study is building on and contributing to, they guide 
this study in the sense that they are the preexisting perspectives regarding protest 
escalation. 
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Sampling 
 The two cases used in this study were chosen because of the similar traits and 
scenarios they shared. In order to credibly compare cases they have to have 
commonalities that can make the connections between them correlate. Meaning that, if 
the cases differed too extensively it would be unclear what the contributing factors were 
to the results. At the same time, these cases come from notably different contexts, which 
this study anticipates contributing to the greater understanding of the phenomena. For 
these two cases, both protests involved issues of government and moral values, both had 
a component of police contribution or complicity in the issue, and both began with a 
peaceful protest approach, which escalated into violence upon police intervention. Taking 
into account the different contexts which center these similar scenarios, will illuminate 
more vividly the commonalities which contributed to the escalation of the events. Other 
reasons for selecting these two cases to study, was for the depth of reports on both events. 
There are enough fact and incident based reports from respected government sources to 
provide data from these cases for this study.  
Limitations 
 The biggest limitation for this study is in regard to the number of cases analyzed. 
This study only examined two cases for comparison, which can make it difficult to 
extrapolate reliable correlation or causation. With more time and resources it would 
strengthen the study to examine two or three more cases to corroborate the findings from 
this study. Another limitation of this study was the lack of primary research to support 
findings from the secondary sources. This is again due to a lack of time and resources. 
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Many of the sources that would be relevant to interview are far away and difficult to 
access on a timeline. However, this was not substantially detrimental to the study, as 
many of the relevant sources have already been interviewed for the various reports 
compiled on these cases. One more limitation, that may eventually be addressed, is lack 
of review from police agencies and personnel. This study would be significantly 
strengthened by feedback from personnel with experience in these types of events and 
situations to comment on what the real time impact of the findings from this study might 
be. However, this may be addressed in the future. If this study becomes of interest to 
police agencies, they will at that time review the study with the reflective lens of real life 
experience to augment and enrich the findings as they apply to their particular context. 
Ethical Considerations 
 This study used only secondary sources and did not involve a human participant 
component. All data collected and analyzed came from archival research of already 
completed reports on the events. In this sense there is no ethical responsibility to 
participants, as there are none. However, this study does hold relevance to current events 
and subject matter that can be viewed as contentious. The ethical consideration to be 
taken into account here has to do with how this study might be received by various 
audiences. While it is impossible to cater to every person who happens to read this study, 
it is important to acknowledge the varying perspectives of significance to this study. 
Police face a lot of criticism, in a position where it is not always easy to find the best 
solution, and protesters and communities struggle to make an impact against the entities 
in power upheld by police agencies. This study attempts to acknowledge these 
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perspectives and address the ethical considerations they embody, through a sincere 
approach to increase understanding of how these groups can work more harmoniously 
together.  
Researcher Influence 
 Throughout my research I have made efforts to confront and challenge my 
preconceived notions as they regard to policing and protest, this section is a means of 
acknowledging my personal bias and the lens that I have brought to this research. My 
initial interest in this subject emerged as I listened to a lecture about unrest in Northern 
Ireland. The presenter, an expert in the conflict in Northern Ireland, described the picture 
of protests and rioting as having remained virtually unchanged over the past 100 years. I 
thought that seemed ridiculous and I couldn’t understand how no changes and 
improvements in management had developed over all of those years. When I further 
refined my topic to focus on protests in the United States, I discovered that theories for 
improvement had been developed, but were not always successfully implemented. At this 
point I had to take a step back to acknowledge, that unlike in the case of Northern 
Ireland, I have personal investment in police practices in the United States, particularly as 
a black woman. This presents an obvious conflict of interest as there is a long history in 
the U.S. of unequal policing and prosecution of African Americans. For this reason, I 
originally steered away from using Ferguson as one of my cases, in an effort to avoid this 
conflict of interest. However, it was a good fit for the study, therefore, I made the 
decision to simply remain constantly aware of biases which stem from my identity.  
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 The values I hold, which I believe show through in this research are largely based 
around civil liberties. I strongly believe that police have a very challenging and complex 
job, which requires nuanced and rapid decision making. I also believe that the primary 
duty of police is to serve and protect, which inherently will take on different forms in 
different scenarios, but part of that is protecting the rights of the people and communities 
they serve. Based on the way police are portrayed when protests are poorly managed, I 
undoubtedly expected to see blatant or rampant police misconduct. It was necessary to 
reflect on that expectation and identify the impetus for that, including media 
sensationalizing. Through this reflection, I chose to take a grounded theory approach 
focusing on specific actions, rather than trying to interpret motivations. Through constant 
reflection throughout this research, I was able to focus my findings and recommendations 
around acknowledging the complexity of protest policing in particular, while promoting 
an approach of respect for civil rights and liberties.  
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Chapter 4 
Findings 
 
 Four reports on police conduct in relation to the protests which escalated in 
Seattle in 1999 and in Ferguson in 2014 were analyzed in order to identify commonalities 
in practice that could explain or give an indication as to why or how these two protests 
escalated in the way they did. For the WTO protest in Seattle, both the Seattle Police 
Department After Action Report and the ACLU incident review were coded for emerging 
themes. For the police shooting protest in Ferguson the federal level After Action 
Assessment and the federal investigation of the Ferguson Police Department were coded 
for emerging themes. These four reports each seemed to maintain their own individual 
focus of concern and it was possible to identify clear turning points in both events, where 
there was potential for the protest to plateau at a manageable level, or escalate. These 
turning points are the main focus of this research, but the contributing and supporting 
factors cited and noted in all of these reports are also important in understanding why 
those turning points went in the direction they did, and how the escalation that occurred 
from those points sustained further escalation throughout the events. 
 Through coding of these documents it became clear that the one of the strongest 
concerns and motivators of police action in these two events was seeking to maintain or 
reestablish order and control.  
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Table 1 
Key finding: Order and Control Focus 
Case Seattle Ferguson 
Prominent codes relating 
to and indicating police 
order and control focus 
(frequency of appearance 
in text) 
- Violation of civil liberties 
(11) 
- Order/control (16) 
- Misconduct (20) 
- Lack of public safety 
focus (13) 
- Use of force (22) 
- Constitutional violations 
(38) 
- Order/control (14) 
- Use of canines (7) 
- Lack of public safety 
focus (22) 
- Militarization (15) 
  
The police are charged with maintaining and protecting public safety as well as 
accommodating the rights of the public to protest and peaceably assemble (ACLU-Wa, 
2000). Though maintaining order and control can sometimes help achieve a public safety 
objective, the findings here indicate that order and control were frequently the main 
objective, as it was often tied to tactics that escalated the situations, such as use of 
chemical irritants like tear gas and pepper spray in the case of Seattle or canines and 
militarization in the case of Ferguson. As the Seattle Police Department (2000) reported 
that the “SPD and its mutual aid allies fought for control of the streets in the downtown 
core and on nearby Capitol Hill. By December 2, order had been restored and there were 
no further major disruptions” (p. 4). The ACLU-Wa (2000) described that the Seattle 
Police Department used “tear gas, pepper spray, rubber bullets and clubs against people 
who were demonstrating peaceably, against demonstrators who had not received or were 
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trying to obey police orders, against bystanders, and to quell disturbances the police 
themselves had provoked” (p. 8).  In Ferguson the Institute for Intergovernmental 
Research (2015) reported on the way “law enforcement staged armored vehicles visibly 
in a way that was perceived as threatening to the community and, at times, used them 
absent danger or peril to citizens or officers” (p. xvii). 
 Preparedness was another contributing factor which arose in the coding. It was 
made evident that neither city’s police department was prepared for the size and intensity 
of the protests they faced. A lot of the failures were cited as a result of this lack of 
preparedness. Few officers involved in these events had had formal or extensive training 
in massive demonstration policing, in multi-agency coordinated actions, or in handling of 
constitutionally protected practices. One of the strongest themes regarding preparedness, 
was that the event was much more expansive than expected.  
Table 2 
Key Finding: Lack of Preparedness 
Case Seattle Ferguson 
Prominent codes relating 
to and indicating lack of 
preparedness (frequency 
of appearance in text) 
- Inadequate 
planning/staffing (39) 
- Lack of training (15) 
- Underestimation (6) 
- Internal communication 
problems (10) 
- Lack of training (9) 
- Poor strategy (10) 
- Internal communication 
problems (14) 
- Arrest mismanagement 
(10) 
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The Seattle Police Department spent months preparing for the WTO conference 
and the expected protests, but when the time came it was far beyond the scope anticipated 
(Seattle Police Department, 2000). As a result the Seattle Police Department did not have 
the staff and resources to manage the protests appropriately to the scale. This was 
demonstrated by an inability to make the necessary arrests of various criminal 
components within the greater peaceful protests. The SPD, instead, used chemical 
irritants to control most components of the protest (ACLU-Wa, 2000 & SPD, 2000). 
Specifically, the SPD (2000) noted that they “did not prepare detailed plans to address all 
contingencies in sufficient depth” (p. 5) for example a special unit meant “to arrest and 
remove extremists engaged in criminal acts… was re-deployed when the Tuesday 
disturbances overwhelmed law enforcement and jeopardized the security of the 
delegates” (p. 19). 
 Similar practice was seen in Ferguson in regards to lack of preparation and 
resources to make appropriate arrests. The protests in Ferguson were not planned at all, as 
they were in Seattle, so there were no months of preparation. The Ferguson Police 
Department used their standard practices to manage the burgeoning protest at the site of 
the Michael Brown’s shooting. It was never expected that the crowd on that afternoon 
would grow into a city wide, multiple week long protest (IIR, 2015). As a result, the 
response in Ferguson was not initially directed as protest policing. There was no initial 
acknowledgment of constitutionally protected protest practices which would need 
allowances made for it and therefore, the entire movement was met with efforts to 
control. As a result, when the criminal component in Ferguson emerged, which granted 
was greater than that in Seattle, Ferguson response resources were already stretched and 
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unable to respond separately to criminal components. The IIR (2015) reported that “the 
St. Louis County PD did not have enough resources, even with a code 1000 [request for 
100 additional officers at a scene] at 8:25 p.m. and, immediately after, a code 2000 
[increased request for additional officers] to control the level of violence and civil 
disobedience that was occurring” (p. 14).  
 Communication also played an important role in creating and maintaining an 
environment of escalation in these two events. As was suggested in the preceding 
literature review, communication can be an essential component of successfully 
managing a protest and creating an environment of community engagement that allows 
for cooperation and understanding between police and protesters. This idea was 
supported by the data collected in coding these documents. Most of the findings indicate 
a complete lack of communication, or a lack of clear and sincere communication leading 
into escalatory interventions. In instances of open and sincere communication there were 
moments where potential for de-escalation were indicated. 
Table 3 
Key Findings: Lack of Communication 
Case Seattle Ferguson 
Prominent codes relating to 
and indicating lack of 
communication 
(frequency of appearance 
in text) 
- Communication with 
public/protesters (17) 
- Use of force (22) 
- Communication with 
public/protesters (34) 
- Community engagement 
(20) 
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 In the case of Seattle there were ample examples of communication efforts, 
effective and not. The most frequent citing of communication was in the After Action 
Report, in which the Seattle Police Department (2000) noted giving verbal orders and 
warnings to protesters to disperse prior to any use of chemical irritants. Only once did the 
report state providing 45 minutes for compliance with verbal orders before employing 
chemical irritants. In every single other example, the report only indicates that a verbal 
order and warning was given, with no indication of how much, if any, time was given for 
compliance. The ACLU-Wa (2000) review indicated that on the occasions when verbal 
orders and warnings were heard by protesters there was no time cushion given for 
compliance before chemical irritants were employed as a method to force compliance. 
This indicates ineffective use of communication, as the ACLU-Wa (2000) review also 
indicated that protesters were frequently unable to hear these verbal orders. The ACLU-
Wa (2000) recounted that “numerous witnesses reported… that police used clubs, gas 
pepper spray and rubber bullets without giving orders to citizens. In some cases, orders 
may have been rendered unintelligible because the speaker was wearing a gas mask” (pp. 
50-51). The number of effective communication instances occurred as negotiations 
between police and protesters. Multiple march routes were negotiated and enacted. One 
particularly noteworthy instance of effective communication occurred when police were 
protecting the Niketown store front from damage. Through communication with 
protesters who did not want the situation to escalate to a point where their protest would 
be forcibly dispersed, police gained the cooperation of many protesters in protecting the 
store front (SPD, 2000). 
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 The situation in Ferguson was greatly hampered by lack of communication. The 
historical community context lacked effective lines of communication, which followed 
into the 2014 protests and impacted the event escalation (U.S. Department of Justice 
Civil Rights Division, 2015). When the protest began there was a complete lack of 
communication between the police investigating and the crowd that was gathering, which 
was waiting for answers about what happened and was happening (IIR, 2015). There was 
already a standard norm for low communication between police and community in 
Ferguson, leading police not to consider any need for communicating and leaving the 
community to develop their own theories about the situation (US DOJ Civil Rights 
Division, 2015). The police continued toward their objective of order and control while 
the community waited more and more restlessly for answers. This dynamic continued 
throughout the extent of the protests (IIR, 2015). There was one instance emphasized 
where there was a change in this dynamic, when command of police response changed 
hands, and a new focus was brought to community engagement and communication (IIR, 
2015). 
 While each of these components compound on the last, one common issue was 
present that would have been liable to forestall the best preparations or strategies from 
working effectively, the issue of poor internal communication. In both events there were 
issues with the command centers communicating strategies, positions, and other cues 
required for effective coordination between officers and agencies.  
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Table 4 
Key Findings: Internal Communication Problems 
Case Seattle Ferguson 
Prominent codes relating to 
and indicating problems 
with internal 
communication 
(frequency of appearance 
in text) 
- Internal communication 
problems (10) 
- Control coordination (8) 
 
- Internal communication 
problems (10) 
- Leadership 
inconsistencies (5) 
  
During the protests in Seattle, there were problems with the radio communication 
system being overloaded with multiple aspects of the event management. The SPD 
(2000) noted that not having a dedicated frequency for logistics, such as resupplying 
equipment and coordinating food and breaks, caused noticeable and impactful losses in 
logistic efficiency. There was also speculation that protest groups tapped into the police 
radio frequency and were therefore able to avoid police maneuvers. The ACLU-Wa 
(2000) indicated the confusion brought to protesters as a result of different units giving 
contradicting orders, due to lack of internal communication and coordination between 
units.  
 Much of the internal communication issues in the Ferguson case came from 
confusion of leadership hierarchy. Multiple agencies were working together that did not 
have experience working together in this type of context. The officers from various 
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agencies prioritized direction from their own leadership and there was confusion initially 
about which organization was the command lead (IIR, 2015). Eventually, the state 
Governor stepped in and officially appointed Captain Ronald S. Johnson of the State 
Highway Patrol as the incident commander. This new command improved efforts to 
address many of the other issues contributing to the ongoing escalation of the protests in 
Ferguson, however the internal communications issues were not rectified in a way that 
allowed for full and coordinated implementation of the new strategies. Some of the 
strategies were implemented, such as increased community engagement and 
communication, specifically conducted by the Captain of the State Highway Patrol. 
However, the progress achieved in implementation of this strategy was not sustained, as 
other units and officers were not equally engaged with the new strategy (IIR, 2015). 
There was speculation about these strategies being undermined by officers, as there were 
indications that the community engagement of the incident commander was felt to be 
unsupportive of officers, lowering officer morale (IIR, 2015). Regardless of the veracity 
of that idea, any lowered morale and feelings of loss of support can be attributed to the 
strong themes of poor internal communication.  
 Each of these issues played substantial roles in maintaining the escalation of these 
two protests, as well as contributing to the scenarios which spurred the initial escalation. 
Both of these protests had evident turning points where police made decisions about how 
to proceed which negatively impacted the situation, by feeding tensions and not narrowly 
addressing the public safety needs, in pursuance of order and control. In both events the 
police actions taken at the turning points could be interpreted as demonstrations of 
control and power in response to earlier mistakes in judgement or preparation. 
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 The major turning point in Seattle occurred at the start of the event when 
protesters successfully blocked travel routes for WTO delegates and police had to retake 
that ground (ACLU-Wa, 2000). The police were not prepared to effectively protect the 
safe travel zones for delegates, as was one of their primary duties in providing security 
for the WTO event. In order to follow through on that responsibility, extra officers were 
deployed to assist in regaining control of the travel zones. Not only did this move draw in 
officers away from other deployment areas, it set a precedent of police chasing protesters 
out of the way of the WTO conference.  
In terms of how this shift in deployment affected the turn of events, the SPD had 
originally planned for special unit of officers to intercept criminal components within the 
protest. As more and more officers were redeployed to help maintain control of 
conference areas, that special unit became impossible to implement and the “SPD missed 
a crucial opportunity to remove leadership of the unlawful disruptive element early on the 
first day of the WTO” (SPD, 2000, p. 6). With the disruptive element still in play the 
effort to maintain control of the conference area appeared more precarious. The immense 
number of protesters in the area combined with the loose criminal element led the SPD to 
move their controlled territory outward and brought on the initial use of chemical irritants 
to force compliance (SPD, 2000). From the moment the SPD had to retake territory they 
were playing a game of catch up, exerting their authority by holding onto and reaching 
out for whatever control they could. From here, the other factors indicated above 
continued to contribute to the ongoing escalation of the event. 
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In Ferguson the turning point was also very near the beginning of the event. As 
the crowd grew around site of Michael Brown’s shooting, the Ferguson Police 
Department continued to increase their security around the site while the scene was being 
investigated. The FPD maintained a focus on order to protect the crime scene and failed 
to address the concerns of the gathering community. The lack of communication at this 
point allowed the growing crowd to see a police presence growing in size and 
aggressiveness, as canines were also brought to the scene (IIR, 2015). The police also 
saw a crowd growing in size and hostility, as they heard the community’s anger without 
understanding that the lack of communication was spurring it. Tensions continued to rise 
between the growing police presence and the growing community presence, as neither 
group engaged the other in clarifying dialogue. The police remained focused on 
maintaining order to complete their task, which once complete, the FPD all cleared the 
area, still never having clarified with the crowd any details of what had happened and 
what was going on (IIR, 2015). From here the community was left to speculate about the 
intentions and actions of the police throughout the afternoon. Based on the history of the 
FPD and their relationship in this community, the speculation was negative and the 
aggressiveness and lack of communication from their presence supported these negative 
perceptions. As a result of the FPD’s aggressive showing and lack of communication the 
tensions that grew during the crime scene investigation were never assuaged and the 
observing crowd became a demonstration.  
At the point when the FPD left the initial scene the crowd had escalated into a 
demonstration. Although the demonstration was directly demanding answers and 
accountability at this point, it was still in a peaceful demonstration stage, however, it was 
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an unexpected result for the FPD and they were unprepared to address it. From this point 
on, the factors indicated above continued to contribute to the mounting escalation of the 
event. The FPD responded to the demonstration with the same showing of power as they 
had at the initial scene and reconfirmed the perceptions that had helped to raise the 
tensions at the onset. As the protest progressed through the days, another turning point 
arose. With the implementation of the State Highway Patrol Captain as the incident 
commander, new strategies were developed to deescalate the situation. Particularly 
community engagement in communication. As the lack of this had allowed for growing 
tensions, this was an attempt to reverse that. This tactic showed signs of effectiveness, as 
the demonstrators were finally having their concerns heard and addressed. However, this 
turning point failed to turn the situation back towards de-escalation as a result of poor 
internal communication. The FPD chose to release information about the shooting, 
specifically identifying Darren Wilson as the officer responsible, which was in line with 
the new strategy, however, they simultaneously released video footage which indicated 
that Michael Brown had been involved in a robbery prior to the shooting (IIR, 2015). 
This action again escalated the event and undermined the community engagement 
strategy that the new incident commander had tried to implement. As the IIR (2015) 
explained “many community members believed the police were trying to take focus away 
from Officer Wilson and place it on Mr. Brown. Some saw this as a police conspiracy 
while others saw it as an attempt to justify the shooting. Rather than ease community 
tensions, the announcement inflamed tensions and actions” (pp. 21-22).  
The end of these two events came about through addressing many of the 
deficiencies noted above. In Seattle, they received support from the Washington National 
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Guard which create relief and room for maneuvering resources. With the added support 
of the National Guard the SPD was able to intercept un-permitted demonstrations. This 
allowed the SPD to reestablish space for police to communicate with protesters, drawing 
back the lines on controlled territory and for protests to occur without any use of force to 
maintain control (SPD, 2000). In Ferguson the community engagement strategy was 
undermined, however, strategies to demilitarize the police presence relaxed the escalation 
coming out of the struggle for power and control. This made it possible for the situation 
to deescalate at the request of Michael Brown’s family in respect of his funeral (IIR, 
2015).  
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Chapter 5 
Discussion 
 Protest and civil disobedience pose a considerable dilemma to police who have a 
duty to protect the public, in terms of safety and security, as well as in exercising civil 
liberties. In the context of protests these duties involve protecting public infrastructure, 
business, and physical safety, as well as the constitutional rights to assemble and of free 
speech. With even a simple cursory overview of the protests and demonstrations that 
occur in the United States, it is evident that this is not an easy balance to reach. Through a 
critical comparison of the cases of the Seattle 1999 protest and the Ferguson 2014 protest, 
some recurring and prominent themes arose as playing important roles in losing this 
precarious balance. The shortcomings that contribute to protest escalation, based on the 
findings described in the previous chapter, appear to have a layering and compounding 
effect stemming from a basic lack of preparation, which then led to and was exacerbated 
by, poor communication, both internal and external, and a too narrow police focus on 
order and control.  
In relation to the research question, the findings tend to support the propositions, 
although the factor of preparedness was not initially anticipated. The research question 
sought to discover how different police actions in protests can escalate the event into a 
riot, what factors are present when this occurs, what are the situations which necessitate 
that police make turning point choices, and what tools or concepts can police apply to 
successfully navigate these situations in a community focused nonviolent or non-
confrontational way. The propositions suggested that continuous open communication, 
positive prior community relations, and a positive view of protesters and police would be 
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beneficial to the successful navigation of protests. None of these propositions 
encompasses preparedness, which was found to be a significant factor, however, that 
preparedness influenced the other factors addressed in the propositions. Though prior 
community relationship could positively impact some of the other themes and be tied into 
preparedness as well as communication, it did not emerge as a strong theme in regards to 
protest escalation. This suggests that these other factors, presented above, tend to 
influence the course of protests more, at least in as far as they are examined as discrete 
incidents, as opposed to ongoing daily community and police activity. 
 The preparation levels differed in the two cases examined, yet both were 
inadequate in providing the response agencies with the tools and resources to properly 
address these large scale protests. While Seattle made a concerted effort to prepare for 
this event, they relied heavily on past local experiences with protests, which didn’t 
involve inter-agency cooperation (SPD, 2000). The SPD understood the need to protect 
the civil liberties of protesters, yet when the event occurred this became more difficult 
than anticipated and the training and preparation they had established was not sufficient 
to appropriately handle the mass of people and conflicting interests. The SPD worked 
with neighboring police departments to enable the deployment of more officers to handle 
the estimated size of the event, however joint training with these other agencies prior to 
the event was limited. As a result they were unprepared for the challenges of 
communication and coordination that would arise between the agencies. The SPD also 
did not have extensive experience dealing with protests of this magnitude, nor in the 
context of also providing security for an international level conference. The experience 
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that the SPD was drawing from did not have the same level of conflicting interests as the 
WTO protest, which aimed to shut down the WTO conference altogether.  
 The lack of preparation was most evident at the very start of the conference, when 
the opening ceremony had to be canceled due to blockades of protesters. The protesters 
physically blocked delegates from travelling from their hotels to the conference venue. 
The SPD had not prepared a clear and protected route for the delegates and as a result had 
to use force to clear the way for conference delegates to travel. The backtracking of the 
SPD at this juncture illuminated how overall under-prepared they were and also 
destabilized the preparation they did have. No longer could they have confidence in the 
tactics of past experience. As a result, the standards of practice involving heavy deference 
to civil liberties were abandoned as ineffective, in favor of methods of control that would 
prioritize the conference interests. 
 In comparison to the preparation in Ferguson, Seattle was far ahead, yet the SPD 
still seemed to reach similar dilemmas in regards to protecting protester civil liberties. 
While the FPD was not forewarned of the upcoming protests, they also relied on a multi-
agency response to the protests. Just as in Seattle, these agencies had minimal training or 
experience working together in a coordinated effort, much less in response to a protest of 
this scale. On the same token, the FPD had much less experience with protests than 
Seattle and therefore, did not start with the same premise of heavy deference to civil 
liberties. This difference in starting points seems to not have made a substantial 
difference, when considering how quickly Seattle abandoned that approach in favor of 
control. The FPD began their interaction with the growing crowd using control oriented 
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posturing, while Seattle took on that approach after losing ground during their initial 
deferential approach. The FPD began the interaction with their standard approach to 
policing, which emphasized order and police prominence, without awareness of the 
mounting tensions that were boiling into protest. Without this prior knowledge, they were 
not prepared to interact in any kind of specialized way to a protest situation, if they would 
have intended to approach a protest differently at the outset.  
 From this initial lack of preparedness, simply in not knowing that the community 
was on the verge of protest, the FPD had faced the same, and greater, lack of preparation 
in training and experience for handling large scale protest and inter-agency response. 
Once it was clear that the community had moved into protest, the FPD continued with 
their standard response tactics, not having alternate plans for protest, aside from bringing 
back-up from neighboring agencies. Though calling for support was an established 
system, the agencies had not trained together to provide a coordinated response to 
protests causing confusion in leadership and strategic objectives. 
 The police response in both of these protests retained a penchant toward control 
and order that was influenced by the issues in preparation and cultivated the escalation of 
the protests. Without the necessary training and preparation to handle these large scale 
protests with effective tools and resources, the responders were inclined to resort to less 
refined methods to accomplish less refined goals. In Seattle, the SPD chose to adjust their 
focus in favor of the WTO conference interests and chose to address this objective by 
essentially removing the protest from the area. This directly opposed the objective of the 
protesters, who wished to have their message heard by the conference participants and 
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therefore, pushed back against this police effort. The SPD claimed to be targeting the 
destructive and violent component of the protest, however, they used broad sweeping 
tactics which swept up peaceful protesters as well. The mass use of chemical irritants, as 
well as shutting down to protesters, the downtown area surrounding the conference, 
showed a prioritization of order to protecting civil liberties. The SPD continued to use 
methods of control, pushing protesters further and further from the conference, without 
making a clear delineation of where the protesters should go. While these control tactics 
may have removed violent and destructive actors from the vulnerable area, it also swept 
up the entirety of the peaceful protest component and even uninvolved civilians and 
residents.  
 There was a comparatively larger violent destructive component to the protests in 
Ferguson, and likewise the FPD response maintained an equivalently broadly sweeping 
order and control approach to that seen in Seattle. Unlike in Seattle, where past police 
experience preferred to show deference to civil liberties and constitutionally protected 
activity, the FPD was shown to have a history of responding with additional efforts 
towards control when encountering constitutionally protected activity (U.S. DOJ Civil 
Rights Division, 2015). The FPD tended to view constitutionally protected behavior as 
undermining of police authority, therefore the police response was to reassert authority 
through control tactics. This was affirmed by how quickly canines and armored vehicles 
made their appearance at the outset, as the protest had not yet actualized. These tactics 
continued throughout the two weeks of the protest, maintaining the atmosphere of 
escalation. This focus on control also contributed to preventing the strategic changes in 
objective, which the new command attempted to implement, from working effectively. 
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The new strategy was to take a community engagement and communication approach, 
acknowledging the protest purpose and community goals. Part of this was sharing 
information with the community about the shooting, specifically the name of the officer 
involved. However, the strategic effort of the release of that information was undermined 
by the assertion of control implied in the concurrent release of the robbery footage. This 
sustained the escalated atmosphere. It wasn’t until the response withdrew the militarized 
presence that the situation was able to deescalate.  
 As a component of the lack in preparation, was the ineffective internal 
communication, which also contributed to the undermining of changing strategic 
objectives, as well as any tactics which required coordinated efforts. This was particularly 
evident in the case of Ferguson, as it was unclear to the participating agencies who was in 
command, and how that command applied across the agencies. Again, this issue related 
heavily to the lack of preparedness and training. As these agencies did not have extensive 
experience working together, they were not familiar with command practices for an 
incident of this magnitude. Eventually, Captain Johnson of the State Highway Patrol was 
appointed as the official incident commander and the command lines were technically 
clarified. However, without prior combined training to support the new authority and 
without the experience to legitimize that authority to the responding officers and 
agencies, his authority was mostly just a title. As a result, the new strategic efforts were 
not understood and therefore viewed as undermining police authority on the ground. 
While the command lines may have been clarified, the internal communication was not 
improved, and the various agencies continued to be unable to work in effective strategic 
coordination.  
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 The agencies in Seattle also struggled to effectively coordinate actions as a result 
of poor internal communication. This can again be linked back to preparation, as the SPD 
(2000) cited their over-saturated radio frequency as being a major contributor to their 
issues with internal communication. The lack of internal communication resulted in 
contradicting orders being given to protesters, creating a situation in which it was 
impossible to comply with police demands, leading to further escalation. The problems 
with internal communication also contributed to officer fatigue and stress, due to logistics 
and supplying failures. This, compounded by a lack of relief resources, resulted in 
officers working 15 hours without breaks to rest or eat (SPD, 2000). The amount of stress 
and exhaustion these officers encountered is not conducive to maintaining fine-tuned 
discretion and can be considered a contributing factor to the broad sweeping control and 
order tactics employed.  
 While the preparedness, and internal communication issues paved the way for a 
focus on order and control, the issues of external communication exacerbated the 
reception of the police actions in these two cases. While the event in Seattle escalated due 
to a turning point related to poor planning and preparation and efforts at recovery from 
that, the sustained escalation was aggravated due to unclear communication with 
protesters. Conversely, the turning point in Ferguson escalated from a complete lack of 
communication with the community, which persisted along with the escalated 
atmosphere. 
 In Seattle, the focus on order and control brought on aggressive use of chemical 
irritants and other means of control, which escalated the situation, however, these police 
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actions persisted with a perception of protester non-compliance. This non-compliance can 
be linked to unclear communication. Protesters were not always provided audible or 
consistent instructions from police, making it impossible to appropriately comply. 
However, as the event in Seattle came to a close, the de-escalation seemed to be 
facilitated by open and constructive communication. 
 In Ferguson, though it is unlikely that open and constructive communication 
would have precluded the protests, it is likely that it would have greatly reduced the 
intensity and extent of the protests. The findings showed that the lack of forthcoming 
information from the FPD at the onset of the event increased tensions at the start, and 
these tensions remained high as the sought after information continued to be withheld. 
However, similarly to the Seattle case, when open and constructive communication 
occurred it brought about a de-escalation, however short-lived. Furthermore, the protest 
was brought to a tentative conclusion through communication facilitated by the incident 
responders. 
 In respect to the turning points identified in these two cases, some conclusions can 
be drawn about how police influence and respond to those situations in ways that can 
either escalate or deescalate the situations. The turning points refer specifically to 
moments in the events where actions, taken or not taken, moved the situation onto a 
trajectory of continued escalation, particularly when possibly more calculated actions 
could have moved the situation in the opposite direction. In the case of Seattle, the 
turning point was clearly the result of inadequate preparation and an effort to regain 
control. While in Ferguson the turning point was the result of lack of communication 
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between police and the community and efforts to assert control. The common factor in 
these to turning points are police efforts for control. In Seattle, the police lost control due 
to inadequate preparation, but in Ferguson police maintained control, yet continually 
escalated their presence and showing of control without openly communicating their 
intent to the community it was impacting. This occurred a second time in Ferguson, when 
police reasserted their position of control in their presentation of new information to the 
community. These three turning points, in these two protests, suggest that police response 
needs to be very cautious, precise, and intentional in their use of control tactics and the 
objectives those tactics aim to achieve. 
 Preparation is the key to getting the other components right. Though, as was seen 
in Seattle, even extensive preparation can be undermined by failures in other areas. 
Nevertheless, preparation which addresses police to community communication needs 
and procedures, internal communication protocols, standards, and hierarchies, and 
provides ample training and resources for understanding refined application of control 
tactics and the relationship of strategies and objectives, should prove to be considerably 
impactful in deescalating those turning point situations. 
 The themes brought forth in the findings, and discussed here, had substantial 
impact in these two cases. Preparation set the stage for everything that occurred 
throughout both events, and influenced how police responded to the circumstances they 
encountered in the protests. This included establishing, whether intentional or not, a focus 
on order and control in the response efforts. Communication also played a vital role in the 
playout of events. While communication between police and protesters was substantially 
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important in deescalating events, internal communication also emerged as an important 
factor. The internal communication aspect can be strongly tied to the preparedness factor, 
as it is a part of the internal systems and protocols necessary in effectively coordinating a 
large scale incident response. These themes emerged as substantial to these two cases, but 
these findings are still limited.  
 The findings discussed in this section show the most significant themes 
concerning the escalation of the protests in these two cases. While the themes discovered 
were comparable and enlightening, they are only two cases. As this research stands, 
though a relationship can be a seen, a true correlation cannot be established based on data 
from these cases alone. This research should be extended further to examine more 
protests, to corroborate the findings of this study and to determine what themes may have 
been overlooked in these two cases. To delineate true best practices that can be shared 
and disseminated to aid in protest policing, a more thorough understanding of protest 
escalation should be established through extensive research of many cases. Currently 
there are new cases arising in the United States as potential studies to be added to this 
research. Adding any number of more cases to this study would serve to deepen the 
understanding and strengthen the conclusions. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 Protest is an integral component of U.S. democracy that allows the public to voice 
dissent, advocate for their beliefs, and hold those in power accountable. Protest is 
therefore protected constitutionally in order that the government and other powerful 
entities cannot silence people for bringing attention to concerns. This is seen as important 
to maintaining a free democracy, the accountability protest seeks lies in giving the public 
a fuller picture of what their choices mean, allowing the public to more fully vote their 
conscience. Those in power therefore, have an interest in hearing out protest and 
changing their behavior to more closely align with public values. This is the ideal of 
protest in U.S. democracy. 
 The reality of protests in the United States is not as clean and smooth as 
democratic ideals tend to depict it. While there is an expectation in American society to 
have civil liberties such as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly protected, there is 
also an expectation that communities be safe and the freedom of the public to go about 
their daily business with safety and security is appreciated. The government is 
responsible for providing public safety and security as well as protecting civil liberties. In 
the context of protests, these government responsibilities can become entangled. Protests 
aim to disrupt the everyday norms in order to draw public attention to their issue of 
concern. This disruption is where problems start to arise. 
 The police agencies are the governmental bodies that bear the brunt of managing 
the challenge of protests. Police are charged with protecting the public, safety and civil 
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liberties alike. The challenge for police is how to protect both public safety and civil 
liberties if one is in conflict with the other. This is not a simple task, as is demonstrated 
by the frequency at which protests escalate into riots, or even seeming battles for control 
of the streets. This outcome is favorable for neither police nor protesters. With this 
outcome there is increased risk for all parties involved, risk of injury, and risk of damage 
and destruction, as well as risk of violations of constitutional rights. Knowing the risks 
and drawbacks illustrates the importance of properly managing protests to avoid these 
negative outcomes. 
 As the above literature review showed, managing protests is not a new concern 
and the strategies, tactics, and theories have changed over the years. There was a time 
when protest crowds were not seen as rational people and instead treated as an unthinking 
and easily manipulated mob. That perspective provided the groundwork for protests to be 
treated with minimal discretion to civil liberties and protesters handled with force. Over 
time this mob mentality perspective was determined to not accurately describe the way 
people behave in crowds and in protests, and a new strategy of negotiated management 
emerged, which focused on giving more deference to First Amendment rights. This new 
approach was more passive and more careful in how and when force was used, to provide 
a narrow approach tailored to protect civil liberties. Yet, even with this strategy, history 
shows frequent examples of falling back on heavier control tactics notorious to the mob 
mentality approach. Though there is plenty of research demonstrating the various ways 
that police presence can influence the escalation of protests, and suggesting the types of 
presence that should be the most effective in the successful management of a protest, 
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cases continue to arise in which protests do escalate and the new strategies are 
abandoned.  
 This research was designed to address the gap in the research between what type 
of police presence and actions escalate protests and what behaviors lead to effective 
successful protest policing, the gap where the problem and solution both seem to be 
understood, yet there is a disconnect in practice. The examples of the incident in Seattle 
in 1999 and the incident in Ferguson in 2014 were used to delve into an examination of 
this gap. By examining two cases where protests escalated, this research focused on what 
practices served to escalate or deescalate the situation and what was the moment that 
precipitated the escalation or led to sustained escalation, as well as what occurred when 
these two events eventually deescalated again.  
 The case in Seattle, WA in 1999 began as protests of the WTO conference 
occurring over the course of a week in downtown Seattle. Many protesters were Seattle 
residents, but the conference was of an international scale and likewise, protesters came 
from all over to speak out against the policies that the WTO represent and support. The 
city spent months planning the logistics of this conference and the SPD, in charge of 
security, spent those months in planning as well. Unlike the prior WTO conference in 
Geneva where security erected barriers of fencing, concrete, and even barbed wire, the 
Seattle Police Department chose to essentially follow their usual approach to protest. The 
SPD had the perspective of leniency to protest as their general experience was with 
largely peaceful demonstrations and the SPD viewed the approach used in Geneva as 
excessive, based on their past experience (SPD, 2000). When the conference began the 
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protest was peaceful, but the numbers and organization of the protesters overwhelmed the 
SPDs resources and caused the cancelation of the first event of the conference. From this 
point the police began a different approach, in which they ordered and forced protesters 
away from the immediate area of the conference, and continued to enforce this movement 
away from downtown using chemical irritants and other less lethal force, over the course 
of the next few days. This continued and prevented protests from addressing the WTO 
directly until the National Guard arrived to support. Once the incident response was able 
re-organize, they adjusted their approach to allow protests to address the conference 
again. 
 The case in Ferguson, MO in 2014 began with the local community gathering at 
the site of the fatal shooting by police of 18 year old African American Michael Brown. 
As the day wore on, more members of the community arrived and the police presence 
also increased with the addition of canines and armored vehicles. This continued until the 
police were done investigating the scene, the body was removed, and the police departed. 
The crowd of community members did not disperse and the tensions which had 
accumulated with the police presence turned the crowd from vigil that night, into 
protesters by the following day, seeking answers, explanations, and accountability over 
the shooting. The protest moved in front of the police station and police presence again 
mounted with the return of canines and armored vehicles. Tensions remained high and a 
night of unrest began. From this point forward a pattern of protest during the day and 
unrest at night occurred, with police maintaining a militarized presence to enforce order. 
The incident response shifted slightly with the appointment of a new incident 
commander, but it was not until over two weeks after the shooting that the unrest 
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deescalated, with a decreased militarized police presence and a request from Michael 
Brown’s Family. 
The data for this study was collected and coded from secondary sources 
recounting the two cases. Official federal and state governmental reports detailing the 
events of the protest in Seattle and in Ferguson were examined and coded by noting and 
extracting recurring and central themes. After the initial extracting of recurring themes, 
these themes were re-evaluated to determine overlapping concepts, and the codes were 
then refined based on the second evaluation to determine what the most significant 
concepts presented in the reports were. This coded data was then analyzed using the 
constant comparative method of grounded theory. This method aims to develop a 
conceptual understanding of the issue based on the patterns that emerge from the data and 
building on past related research. 
 The results of this research indicated that appropriate preparation plays a vital role 
in how and what strategies are utilized in protest policing, including the nature of the 
response to unexpected situations. This lack of preparation was continually stressed in the 
After Action Report of the Seattle Police Department (2000). However, the amount of 
time the SPD had to prepare, as well as information from previous WTO conferences 
would make it seem that they should have been plenty prepared. This incongruity in time 
and information available for preparation and the actual experience of preparation at the 
time of the event, is cause for concern. One of the problems in the SPD preparation was 
in regards to officer deployment. There were not sufficient personnel resources to relieve 
officers in reasonable intervals and there were not sufficient personnel resources to make 
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the narrow control choices necessary to prevent escalation. This can account for how and 
why choices directed at broad sweeping control were made, but that still leaves questions 
about how the SPD determined what size response they would need for the event. 
Evidently, their conclusion was insufficient, but whether that was due to an 
underestimation of the protest size, or to some other factor, such as budget, may or may 
not be relevant. 
 With the realization of insufficient personnel resources, it should have been clear 
that some strategies would have to change. What occurred was a shift from a strategy that 
accommodated protest, to a strategy that pushed it continually outward. It is unclear if 
this was truly a strategy in response to changing circumstances, or simply a reaction. This 
is a question that brings preparation, as it pertains to training, to the forefront. Were the 
officers deployed trained extensively enough to prepare them for changing and 
unpredictable circumstances? With the dramatic shift in tactics, it seems that this may not 
have been the case. 
 The situation in Ferguson brings the issue of training even more vividly to the 
forefront. While the Ferguson Police Department had procedures in place for calling in 
support from neighboring agencies, they had minimal field training on how this multi-
agency approach coordinated itself. This was evidenced by the need for the Governor to 
step in and specifically appoint an incident commander. Further evidence came from the 
fact that changes in strategy were either not fully communicated across agencies, or the 
command was not trusted or respected enough to engage follow through on new 
strategies. This is particularly concerning, because it indicates that even had the FPD 
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good prior community relations, or communication, or preparation, any coordinated 
efforts would be doomed to failure, due to lack of inter-organizational command 
standards. 
 Also of critical concern in the case of Ferguson was the very poor relationship 
between the police and the community. This negative relationship catalyzed the protest 
and colored the police actions and interactions from the start. Unlike Seattle, where the 
SPD had initially hoped to accommodate protests, there was never this perspective from 
the FPD, nor was there this expectation from the community. This is a concern because, it 
precludes a successful protest management simply due to lack of consideration for 
protester rights, influenced by the fact that police do not have a relationship with the 
community that they would wish to preserve and likewise the community does not have 
confidence in police concern for their rights either.  
Key findings 
• Police focused on order and control as a primary priority. 
• Police lacked sufficient preparedness for the scale of protest in terms of training 
and efficient protocols. 
• Incident response lacked ongoing and open communication between police and 
protesters. 
• Incident response lacked adequately functioning communication systems within 
and across police agencies and units. 
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Recommendations 
1. The first recommendation is that it should be ensured that every response 
personnel understands the strategic objectives to the incident response. This is 
the most basic and immediate frontline preparation and precaution that can be 
made.  If each officers understands the goals and strategies, they will 
automatically be better equipped to make in the moment choices that align with 
those strategic objectives.  
This will by no means solve every problem, but it is entirely necessary if it is 
hoped that officers make informed decisions. This recommendation will be of 
value when there are breakdowns in internal communication and officers and 
units have to make choices independently. This will also be of value when 
officers encounter unexpected situations that may or may not have been covered 
in prior trainings. With an understanding of the strategic objectives officers that 
do not have a protocol set up can instead consider what actions, to their 
knowledge, will best address the established strategic objectives. 
2. The second recommendation is extensive training in protection of civil liberties 
and constitutional rights. This should include what exactly are protesters rights 
and what responsibility do police have to protesters. This should also include 
training on techniques and tactics for intercepting criminal elements without, or 
only minimally, impeding the rights of surrounding protesters.  
 From this training, officers and agencies can develop an arsenal of tactics and the 
strategic objectives to which they apply. With training of this nature, police 
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agencies should be prepared for protest whether it is spontaneous, or they have 
months of warning.  
3. The third and final recommendation is that neighboring police agencies should 
periodically run joint simulations and exercises to provide experience with 
working together in a coordinated way for large scale incidents. These exercises 
should establish internal communication procedures, as well as standards for 
determining command order, to prevent confusion in the event of an actual 
combined incident response. 
 This process would not only give agencies experience working together and the 
potential to coordinate in a more harmonized way, but it would also provide the 
opportunity to share suggestions and best practices. These agencies would have 
the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the concerns and practices of 
various neighboring agencies and learn and problem solve together, based on 
similar but different experiences. By developing inter-agency relationships in this 
way, they would also establish understanding and trust leading to quicker support 
responses in practice. 
4. Finally, a checklist form for police agency protest preparedness is included in 
the appendix to aid agencies in identifying and establishing their preparation for 
protest engagement. 
 These recommendations are designed to have a positive impact on the issues and 
themes which emerged as the contributing factors which allowed for the escalation of the 
protest in Seattle 1999 and Ferguson 2014. If these recommendations are applied in 
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earnest they should be useful in protest policing, not just in retrospect, but going forward 
to future protests as well. However, more studies should be done to strengthen this 
research and recommendations. 
 Continued research will be imperative as protests are certain to continue 
morphing and changing with the times and issues. This research compared two cases 
which occurred 15 years apart and still found substantial applicable commonalities, 
which reflected a variety of past research on protest policing. Therefore, it is likely that 
this research will also remain applicable. By that same note however, it is telling that the 
past research has in fact remained applicable, yet also remains largely unapplied. It seems 
plausible that, more than further research to understand the right and wrong ways to 
manage protests, concerted efforts should be made to provide resources and training to 
apply these lessons learned and understandings developed, to more and more police 
agencies. This research took a small step in trying to understand what occurs to prevent 
the full and successful application of past research and while these recommendations are 
intended to help with successful application, it does not address how to ensure that 
agencies are getting this information, understanding it, and using it. 
 On the contrary, it is possible that none of this research is at all relevant or 
applicable. Because all past research has required reflective and archival research as 
opposed to experimental, it is not entirely possible to say, with much more than anecdotal 
certainty, what the solution really is. In fact this research itself, though it establishes solid 
themes from the cases, cannot truly identify how or if those protest could have been 
managed successfully. Along the same lines, it is not at all unlikely that protests 
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inherently escalate with police presence. Past research, this included, begin with the 
premise that protests should not escalate, and it is an anomaly when they do. However, 
perhaps the protests that flow without disruption or escalation are the actual anomaly.  
 The two cases analyzed in this research were in reference to protests with 
political, governmental power implications, and were then managed by a branch of that 
system of power. The WTO conference involved delegates from around the world 
discussing trade deals and policies, the protests took issue with these policies and the 
work of the WTO. In Ferguson the protest was directly related to police accountability, as 
it related specifically to the fatal shooting of Michael Brown. As previously noted, 
protests are meant to draw attention to issues of concern with the intent to inform and 
change practices. The established power structures would naturally have opposing 
interests. 
 This conflict of interest is what the First Amendment is designed to mitigate, but 
that does not change the existence of the conflict. Police can train and prepare for protest 
as extensively as they want and still, state and federal pressures, as well as internal 
interests are bound to influence their approach. Even if the protest is not in direct relation 
to police conduct or power, as was the case in Ferguson, protests by nature oppose the 
police interest in protecting the status quo. 
 Research should be undertaken to investigate protester views of and relationship 
to police, to determine if police intervention and involvement of any variety is, or can be 
interpreted as nonthreatening. With the amount of research illustrating how escalation 
occurs and suggesting best practices, it seems strange that escalation continues to occur at 
PROTEST ESCALATION  76 
 
 
the frequency it does. Protests may be transforming in response to changing police 
strategies to maintain the potential for escalation.  
 Furthermore, the use of these research findings and recommendations should be 
explored in application to protests within other Western style democracies. Protest is a 
global practice and this research can be applicable to societies which share similar values 
regarding freedom of expression and respect for civil and human rights. With contextual 
tailoring, this research can provide some foundation for police engagement with protests 
in many Western style democracies. However, this research does not need to be limited to 
societies with similar values to the United States. In places where the public is not 
afforded the same type of civil rights, protests still occur, but with greater risk to the 
participants. For development workers who seek to intervene as observers of human 
rights or advocates for civil and human rights, this research can serve as a guide for the 
types of actions that can support positive protest engagement. 
 This research has suggested that police lack of preparedness, focus on order and 
control, and lack of suitable internal and external communication contribute to protest 
escalation and that implementation of a few training and preparation strategies may be 
effective in mitigating the potential for escalation at the critical moments. This research is 
limited by the scope of cases examined as well as by the premise that protest should not 
escalate. However, the recommendations above are given in sincerity to encourage the 
continued efforts of police in addressing the challenging duty of policing protests. 
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APPENDIX A 
Checklist 
Agency Protest Preparedness Checklist 
Agency_________________________________________________________________
______ 
Incident 
Commander_____________________________________________________________ 
  Establish incident response partnerships with neighboring agencies 
Partner agencies:      Contact person: 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Conduct training exercises with above agencies 
  Establish internal communication protocol and back-up protocol 
  Prepare media statement guidelines 
  Prepare strategic objective guidelines and impress upon participating officers through 
training exercises – including but not limited to: 
• Protect life and property 
• Protect civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy 
• Respect human rights and dignity 
• Carefully consider use of force 
• Adhere to incident command strategy and tactics 
• Communicate pertinent movement, deployment, and use of force to incident 
command 
  Establish standards of communication with protesters on a unit level as differentiated 
from media protocol 
  Establish resource allocation system and officer breaks and duty rotation 
  Other specific contextually based protocols: 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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